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LEGISLATION
Rights and Obligations in the Mutual Fund:
A Source of Law
I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1924 when the newly organized Massachusetts Investors Trust
granted its shareholders the continuing right to redeem their shares,'
the mutual fund as a distinctive enterprise has become an increasingly
important financial institution. The more than 325 funds2 now registered 3 claim a net asset value in excess of 38.2 billion dollars4 with 48
billion dollars predicted to be within their control by 1970.8 Their
portfolios, which are increasing at a rate of more than 3.5 billion
dollars annually, 6 were 5000 per cent larger in 1961 than in 1941.7

The three and one-half million mutual fund shareholders, 8 who
comprise approximately one-sixth of the shareholder market, 9 have
been increasing in number by more than one thousand a day, 10 due
primarily to the good performance of the funds."
1. WHIARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMENCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS:
PREPARED FOR THE SECURrnEs AND EXCHANGE CoMimissIoN 37 (1962) [hereinafter

cited as WHARTON REPORT].
2. SEC ANN. REP. 111 (1964). These are active, open-end investment management
companies (for definition see text accompanying note 21 infra).
3. Registration is required under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a(7),(8) (1964). For further explanation of federal regulatory measures see text
accompanying note 114 infra.
4. SEC, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMIPANY

[hereinafter cited as SEC Report]. The aggregate net asset value
of all registered mutual funds amounted to $38.4 billion as of June 30, 1966.
5. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1965, § 3, at 1, col. 5.
6. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1966, at 110, col. 2. The $3.5 billion aggregate sales
figure for 1965 was achieved by Oct. 31, 1965. The total aggregate sales for 1964
amounted to $3.4 billion.
7. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEctumTms MARKERs pt. 4, at 95 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. The funds used in the sample are only the
member funds of Investment Company Institute, the industry trade association, whose
169 open-end members account for the great bulk of mutual fund assets. During the
same period the total assets of closed-end investment companies increased by only
200%.
8. SEC REPORT 2. These shareholders represented more than 6.7 million accounts
as of Dec. 31, 1965.
9. SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 95.
10. Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 n.1 (1961).
Trhis is an average daily increase in investors over the period between 1951 and 1961.
The current popularity of mutual fund shares is reflected by the initial offering of the
Manhatten Fund which in its first day, Feb. 3, 1966, sold $270 million in shares, and
on its next two public days, March 17 and 18, 1966, sold $28 million more in shares.
Wall St. J., March 21, 1966, at 7, col. 2.
11. Where the Dow-Jones average rose 10.9% in 1965, the 212 funds averaged a
GnowTH 2 (1966)
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Such enthusiasm for mutual funds has not been unanimous however.
Aware of their speedy growth, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) authorized an extensive study of the funds. The result,
published in 1962,12 was highly critical of potential conflicts of
interest between fund management and shareholders, and of the
possible lack of arms-length bargaining between the fund management and the investment adviser.' 3 In 1963 a second report to the
SEC, the Special Study of Securities Markets,14 was made public. It
criticized mutual fund selling practices, insider trading in portfolio
securities, and reciprocal business practices. Finally, the SEC spoke
of the future when in December of 1966 it published 15 its recommendations for specific reforms 16 in the investment company industry.
Through these pronouncements the SEC has demonstrated its concern for the quality of investment company activity and has articulated some of the reservations held by other members 1 7 of the
investment industry as to the wisdom of utilizing mutual funds as a
19% appreciation. Only 13 in a sample of 212 funds declined. The losses ranged
from a 1%to 10.5% while the gains ranged up to 77.5%. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1966, at
58, col. 3. The funds have even had political support. Vice President Hubert Humphrey said in a speech to a group of fund representatives that "[Olne of the greatest
investments in the Great Society is the mutual fund." N.Y. Times, April 30, 1965, at
45, col. 3.
12. This is the WHARTON REPORT, supra note 1. The SEC commissioned the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania to conduct
-the study which was begun in 1958.
13. WHARTON REPORT 3.
14. SPECIAL STuDY pt. 4, 91-92. This report too was prepared by the Securities
Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. Parts 1, 2, 3,
and 5 of the study deal with other portions of the securities markets.
15. SEC REPORT. This, the first statement to be prepared by the SEC itself, was
published more than a year after the date for which it was originally promised.
16. The SEC REPORT recommended that the Investment Company Act be amended
to provide rights of action to private individuals and the SEC in order to enforce the
current provisions of the Act as well as to provide the following limitations on investment company activity:
1) Sales loads shall not exceed 5%of share value.
2) Management fees shall be reasonable and shall reflect economies of size.
3) Front end load contractual purchase plans shall be abolished.
4) The standard of conduct required by the Act shall be violated by an "abuse of
trust." ("Gross abuse of trust" shall no longer be required.)
5) The definition of "affiliated person" shall be broadened so as to insulate directors from additional persons who are likely to have conflicting interests.
6) The SEC shall be authorized to develop and enforce regulations on insider
trading and brokerage practices.
17. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, the largest brokerage house in-the
nation, maintains a policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging the purchase of
mutual fund shares. Their reason for such a posture is that they ". . . don't like. the
management fee or the sales load. We feel that the individual investor can do better
on the open market." Interview with Howard B. Olson, Account Executive, Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, in Nashville, Tenn., March 16, 1966.
An active, personal fiduciary stated that he seldom invested funds in his charge
in mutual funds because of the high sales load and the insulation of actual portfolio
management from the shareholder. Interview, Nashville, Tenn., Nov. 7, 1965.
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medium for prudent investment. The continued growth of mutual
funds in the face of such criticism 18 and reservations sharply reflects
the present and potential importance of this industry in our economy.
Despite the increasing significance of these funds and the attention
focused on them, the legal relationships which structure the interaction among the participants of a fund have not been clearly defined
or developed and today there is no body of mutual fund common
law capable of satisfactorily dealing with the challenges of mutual
fund operation. 19 It is the purpose of this paper to seek out existing
bodies of law which may, by analogy, provide a starting point for
the articulation of mutual fund law.
It is submitted that the absence of a clear starting point for the
development of mutual fund law reflects a failure to analyze adequately the problems of the mutual fund with sufficient concern for
possible similarities to problems already confronted and resolved in
other areas; that such analysis shows the mutual fund to be essentially
similar to the corporation for some purposes and essentially similar
to a trust for other purposes; that analogies from corporate lav and
from trust law, both within the structure of statutory regulation,
ought to be the primary authoritative sources of mutual fund law;
that the reasoning of cases which have decided mutual fund controversies suggests dissatisfaction with the present state of mutual
fund common law; and finally that recent developments in the mutual
fund industry reflect the need for clear standards which are capable
of adequately protecting the participants.

II. THE MUTUAL FUND AND KINDRED LAW
A. The Fund
The typical mutual fund arose as a response to investment demands
18. The criticism in 1963, however, from the WHARTON REPORT and the SPECIAL

STUDY appeared to have lost its dampening effect on the sales of fund shares by 1964.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1965, at 106, col. 3.
19. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation
Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20
RuTGERs L. REv. 181 (1966); Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of
Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONu'TEv. PROB. 777 (1964); Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A
Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REV. 181 (1961); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in
the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961). Note, The Mutual Fund and its Management Company, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1962).

See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207

(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (1961), where the district court judge required 41
pages to find an appropriate source of law and to examine issues that normally are
more briefly resolved.
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caused by increasingly widespread affluence.20 It is technically
referred to as an open-end diversified management investment company,-" but functionally, the fund is an institutional device designed to
unite an investor's money with a diversified, managed portfolio by
having the fund issue its own shares to the investor and then
invest its shareholders' funds in diversified securities. The funds are
"open-end"z2 because their asset value grows with each new share
they issue and sell s and declines with each share they redeem;24

"diversified"O because their investments are not concentrated in the
stock of an individual issuer; "management"2 6 because their investments are alterable by the fund management in pursuit of the fund's
stated investment policy; and are referred to as a "company"2 7 to

include trusts and other legal forms that a fund can assume. Mutual
funds are to be distinguished from other types of investment companies such as the "unit investment trusts,"m "face-amount installment
certificate companies"2 9 and "closed-end investment companies."30
Each presents peculiar problems beyond the scope of this paper.

Normally, the operation of a mutual fund involves three partici20. For a more detailed history of their development see WnATON RE'oRT 37-44,
77-116 (1962).
21. This is the terminology of the Investment Company Act.
22. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(5)(a)(1) (1964).
23. From 1958 to 1961 the net asset value of the mutual funds went from $12
billion to $24 billion. Over half of this increase was due to new sales of their own
shares rather than appreciation of portfolio shares. SPEcrhL SUrmY pt. 4, at 270.
24. For definition of "redeemable security" see Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a(2)(a)(31) (1964).
25. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(5)(b)(1) (1964). This section
,also provides that the fund may invest no more than 5% of its total assets in the
stock of one issuer and may hold no more than 10% of the outstanding voting shares
of any one issuer.
26. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(4) (3) (1964).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 80a(4)(3) (1964).
28. Such trusts are normally organized under a trust indenture and sell to investors
fractional interests in the group of securities comprising the trust corpus. Each share
represents a fractional interest in the "unity" of securities. As of June 30, 1963, 149
such trusts were registered with the SEC. Because of their lack of investment flexibility,
they have been less favorably received than the mutual fund.
29. Such companies issue certificates under which the investor agrees to pay a set
amount to the company on a periodic basis. The company agrees to repay the investor
a specified amount at some future time, which amount represents the investor's payments plus interest. In reality, such a company is a type of savings bank. As of
June 30, 1963, there were ten such companies registered with the SEC compared to
350 mutual funds.
30. Such companies seldom sell or redeem their own shares. The number of outstanding shares of a closed-end company is relatively steady-much like an ordinary
business corporation. The shares are traded on the exchanges with price fixed primarily
by investor interest with no necessary relevance to net asset value. On June 30, 1963,
218 such companies were registered with the SEC.
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pants:31 -the fund board of directors, 32 the investment adviser,3 3 and

the investor. The fund itself is usually organized by a group of
individuals who either form their own adviser company or retain
another investment adviser company3 4 to manage, under contract,

the fund portfolio. The founders of the fund then become its directors and establish investment guidelines35 to control the activity of the

adviser, and arrange for a sales organization to market the fund's
shares. Once operations begin, the mutual fund usually issues its
shares to an underwriter who sells the shares through retailers to the
public. The investor buys from the retail securities dealer, and the

proceeds, less commissions, are turned over to the use of the adviser
to expand the fund's portfolio. The adviser is thus provided with a

continuing source of investment capital to be managed while the
investor, through the fund shares, is provided with investment advice
and the benefits of a diversified portfolio.

B. The Board of Directors
Of the three participants, the fund board of directors is the central

member. Most funds are corporations,3 but some, particularly the

earlier funds, are business trusts.37 Still, the Investment Company

Act, by treating them identically, reflects the essential similarity38
of the two forms for regulatory purposes. In either form, a board
31. In the sample of 156 mutual funds studied by the

WHARToN REPORT,

all but 14

were parties to contracts with an outside investment adviser and hence had three participants. W ARToN REPoRT 6. When there are only two separate participants, these
two are the fund board of directors and the investor. In these cases the adviser is
"internalized" as a part of the fund itself.
32. The term "director" includes any person performing functions essentially equivalent to those performed by a corporate director; that is, a member of a board of
trustees of a mutual fund created in the form of a business trust would also be included. For statutory definitions see Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(2) (a)
(12) (1964).
33. For statutory definition see Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(2) (a)
(19) (1964).
34. Testimony of Hugh W. Long, Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. I, at 600 (1940).
35. The fund, depending on its objectives, may be categorized as a growth, growth
with income, balanced, income with growth, or income. A recent development has
been the emergence of speculative growth funds. The Hubshman Fund, for example,
acknowledges in its prospectus that its proposed "flexible investment policy may 'involve greater than average risks as well as frequent turnover in the fund's portfolio.'
Wall St. J., March 8, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
36. Approximately 80% of the Wharton sample of mutual funds were corporations
with the remaining 20% being business trusts. WHARTON REPoRT 45.
37. The trust form has declined in importance in recent years and only 2 of the 38
open-end companies established between 1952 and 1958 were organized as trusts. Id.
38. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(2)(a)(8), (12), (35) (1964).
See also Saminsky v. Abbott, 41 Del. Ch. 320, 194 A.2d 549 (1963), aff'd, 200 A.2d
572 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964), where the court noted that the Investment Company Act approved the business trust form.
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of directors or the equivalent holds the legal power to manage.
Often the corporate board of a mutual fund consists of seven
men,39 while boards of trustees most frequently have five members. 0
In actual operation, the scope of the board's activity is somewhat
narrower than might be expected. Indeed, fewer than one-tenth of the
41
boards of directors perform active investment decision making duties
since that task is usually delegated either to the investment adviser
or to his representative. 42 Also, there is little discretion with respect
to payment of dividends since in order to avoid taxation on realized
income, most funds avail themselves of the provisions of the tax
law43 which exempt the fund from tax if dividends and gains are
paid out to investors in the same taxable year as they are realized.
Indeed "management," so far as the board is concerned, consists
primarily of periodically reviewing the recommendations of the
investment adviser, determining whether they are consistent with the
general policy of the fund and appraising investment results.
C. The Adviser
The second of the participants, the investment adviser, is a separate
legal entity from the mutual fund. While a majority of these firms
44
are corporations, some are partnerships or even proprietorships.
Three quarters of the corporate advisers have ten or less voting share45
holders, and fully one quarter have but one voting shareholder.
Employee staffs are also small with over half of the firms employing
fewer than ten men.46 With the exception of the smallest advisers,
.39. In the Wharton study sample boards ranged from 3 to 18 members with 7
REPonRT 49.
40. In the Wharton study sample 19 of 39 trusts had a single corporate trustee. Of
the remaining 20 trusts, 7 had 5 trustees on their board. Id.
41. In a substantial number of cases the board's principal function was to fulfill a
REPORT 49.
legal requirement. WHARTON_
42. Id. The active management of the fund's portfolio is less frequently delegated
to one of the principal officers of the fund who is controlled by the investment adviser. Hence the effect is the same-active management of the fund is delegated to an
entity controlled by someone other than the fund.
43. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55.
44. Of 163 advisers in the Wharton study sample 82.2% were corporations, 15.3%
partnerships and 2.5% were individual proprietorships. The proprietorships typically
managed the smaller funds (below $50 million) while the partnerships were most
frequently found in the middle range, from $51 million to $300 million. Corporate
advisers dominated throughout but were especially dominant in the $300 million to

members found in 37 of 115 cases. WHARToN

$600 million range. WmiRToN REPORT 449.
45. WHARTON REPonT 455. Ownership is the dominant means of control in 95% of

the adviser organizations while it is the dominant means of control in only 6% of the
mutual funds. Id. at 461. It should also be noted that a mere 3.1% of the adviser
groups manage 42.9% of the aggregate net assets of the Wharton study sample, while,
at the other end of the spectrum, 50.9% of the adviser organizations manage 1.2% .of
the aggregate net assets. Id. at 440.
46. Only 13%of the Wharton study sample have 100 or more employees. Id. at 444.

1126

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 20

the groups support themselves primarily 1 through fees charged to
48
the fund on the basis of the net asset value managed by them.

This fee compensates the firm for the performance of its duties, which

are usually determined by the contract between it and the fund board

of directors. 49 In most cases, the adviser's primary duties are to

make investment decisions relating to the general portfolio structure
and to make the day-to-day purchases of portfolio securities.50 Although the actual powers exercised by the advisers vary, they are in

virtually all cases the primary source of instructions as to what action
should be taken within the portfolio.
D. The Investor
It is the third participant, the investor, who provides capital, the
life blood of the mutual fund. Although institutional investors 1 are
among fund shareholders, 52 by far the more substantial participation3

comes from individual investors. The typical regular account holder

is a married man, 55 years old, and has about three dependents. He

has at most a limited amount of college education. Moreover, he
is most likely employed in a capacity involving specialized skills, but
47. If the adviser also acts as the fund's underwriter he charges commissions on
sales in addition to the management fee. If, in addition, the adviser purchases portfolio stock in the market for the fund, he receives broker commissions as well. These
are the three major sources of income for advisers who are affiliated with a full service
financial house. Id. at 437-38.
48. In most cases this is a fixed fee but 14% of the adviser groups charge a fee that
varies with the asset value. Id. at 480. As the net asset value climbs, the fee percentage drops. Id. at 483. Nearly one half of the funds charge .5% of the annual
average net assets as of one particular day each year.
49. SPECIAL STOY pt. 4, at 270. Approximately 1/7 of the aggregate net assets and
1/11 of the total number of adviser organizations in the Wharton study sample were
managed by internal advisers, employed directly by the fund and not by a separate
organization. Thus, in these cases there is no express contractual relationship between
the fund board of directors and an adviser organization. 1VHAITON REPoRT 441-42.
50. WHArioN REPORT 49. Still, the scope or decision delegated to the adviser organization is limited by investment objectives enunciated by the fund board of directors.
See text accompanying note 35 supra. For a good discussion of the potential evils inherent in the fund-adviser relationship see Note, 71 YAt. L.J. 137 (1961).
51. Selected American Shares, a mutual fund, found that in addition to individuals,
the following were among its shareholders: trustees, guardians, executors, administrators,
institutional trustees, nominees, churches, colleges, schools, hospitals, libraries, fraternal
associations, welfare associations, cemetery associations, foundations, profit sharing plans,
pension plans and employee benefit plans. These institutions accounted for 11.6% of
Selected American Share's accounts. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1965, § 3 at 1, col. 5.
52. Institutional investors increased their holdings in 1964 by $1 billion to $2.6
billion. N.Y. Times, April 22, 1965, at 44, col. 2. One newly acquired investor was
the 25th Anniversary Gift Fund of the Syracuse University Class of 1952 which announced that all donations would be invested in the One William Street Fund. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1964, at 64, col. 2.
53. The two main shareholder classifications are regular account holders and accumulation plan holders. Regular account holders are those with no formal plans to
make new investments in mutual fund shares, but who have made a "lump sum"
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somewhat short of professional training. 54 His family earns 8100
dollars a year; his fund holdings amount to 5600 dollars; and his
last fund purchase cost 1100 dollars. In addition to his fund
holdings the typical shareholder owns 6100 dollars of three other

corporate stocks and holds 3800 dollars in cash and United States
55
Savings Bonds as well as 8700 dollars face value of life insurance.

He invested his money in mutual funds for a variety of purposes,5 6 the
most frequently mentioned of which are general savings, retirement
income57 and estate accumulation. 58 The primary reason that the
typical shareholder chose a mutual fund over other forms of investment was the prospect of benefit from economical professional management and from diversification.5 9 This small and relatively unin-

formed investor 0 gained most of his knowledge about mutual funds
through a sales representative who by interpretation of information

required to be disclosed 6' by the fund and by personal contact became
the most important influence on the investor's decision to purchase a
investment to which they may or may not add. Accumulation plan holders are those
who invest pursuant to a contractual plan which requires monthly or quarterly payments to purchase additional shares. Approximately 63% of fund shareholders are
regular account holders while 37% are parties to a contractual plan.
54. SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 273.
55. THE MUrTAL FUND SHAinoLEan 2 (1963). These are median figures. In addition to this pamphlet published by the Investment Company Institute, SPEc.L STUDY
pt. 4, at 274 contains a similar computation of statistics but drawn from a smaller
sample. Parallel statistics for accumulation plan holders read as follows: age-43 years;
family income-$9000 annually; value of mutual fund holdings-$2400; amount of
most recent purchase-$72; number of corporate stocks owned-1.3; value of corporate
stock holdings-$2400; bank accounts and U.S. Savings Bonds-$1900; life insurance in
force-$14,500. Tm MUTUAL FUND SimnoLnrm
2 (1963).
56. The investor may initiate the inquiry himself or may be approached by a salesman and be persuaded of the wisdom of investment. Salesmen appear to have been
more important in influencing the investment decisions of contractual plan buyers
than in decisions of regular account purchasers. SpEcIL& STUDY pt. 4, at 141.
57. It should be noted that special plans are available for this purpose. One such
is the systematic withdrawal account which after retirement provides a monthly check
of a specified amount from the shareholder's account paid from dividends and, if required by the amount, from redemptions. Also there are special investment programs
geared to the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 (Keogh Act),
26 U.S.C. § 37 (1964). N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1964, at 108, col. 3.
58. SpECuAL STUDY pt. 4, at 285. See also Tim MUTUAL FUND Sn&,mEoLErm
15
(1963).
59. Tim MUTUAL FUND SHAPEHoLDER 17 (1963).

SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 287.

Almost one half of the contractual plan buyers also cited discipline in saving as a
chief reason for acquiring this type of investment. SPECrAL STUDY pt. 4, at 338.
60. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1960, at 29, col. 7 (indicating average mutual fund investor has little knowledge of securities he buys).
61. A prospectus must be shown the investor before purchase. For the information
contained therein, see note 119 infra. However, 20% of the regular account holders and
10%of the contractual plan holders never see a prospectus. SPECIAL STmr pt.'4, at 339.
Even among those who do there is a low level of knowledge. The legal tone and
lack of explanations limit the effectiveness of the prospectus. SPECLL STUDy pt. 4, at
348.
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particular fund.62 Once his decision was made, the investor either

purchased shares issued by the fund for a regular account, or signed a
contractual accumulation plan 63 and began periodic payments toward
the purchase of shares. In either case his shares were purchased
on the over-the-counter market at a price determined by the per share

net asset value6 plus a sales load (commission) 65 which is usually

substantial. 66 Despite a significant financial commitment the typical

purchaser has only a modest understanding of his investment. More
than sixty per cent can not give a reasonable estimate of the rate of
the sales commission; seventy-five per cent do not know that there

are funds with different sales loads, and seventy to eighty per cent
can not estimate what per cent of net asset value is charged as a

fee for management and administration. 67 There is also some question
as to the knowledge of the investor of the identity of the investment

adviser organization. 68 Even without the support of a careful under-

standing of the investment, most investors expect their fund to do
better 6 than the stock market in the next 10 years and most expect
70
it to surpass its own past performance.

Thus in the basic operation of most mutual funds, many small
unsophisticated investors are in essence persuaded by salesmen to
62. Other important influences cited were investor's independent appraisal and advice
of friend or relative. SPECIAL Srun pt. 4, at 297.
63. See note 53 suprafor definition.
64. The per share net asset value for the purpose of fixing share selling and redemption prices is computed twice daily by adding together the current market value of
the fund's investments, deducting liabilities and dividing by the number of shares
outstanding. Liabilities are generally minor items.
65. Most funds charge sales commissions of varying amounts, but there are some
no-load funds the majority of whose shares are sold by mail.
66. Acquisition charges vary among funds and, within funds, vary with dollar amounts
of shares purchased or committed to be purchased. Charges of 8% to 8 1/2% are
common, 6% or more of which is generally paid to the retail distributor of the shares,
the balance being retained by the fund's principal underwriter. The principal undervriter who operates under a contract with the fund and is usually the investment adviser as well, bears the entire cost of literature, statistical presentations and other
sales aids provided to investment retailers. WHAITON tEronR 469, 471. The regular
account holder and the voluntary plan purchaser each pay the same sales charge on
each purchase while the contractual plan holder, as an incentive to continue payments,
pays about 50%of his first 12 or 13 payments as a sales charge and then 2% to 5V of
the remaining payments. SPECAL Stuny pt. 4, at 172.
67. SpIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 343-44.

68. See Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 214 (D. Del. 1960):
"[Tihis Court was surprised when two of defendants' expert witnesses, particularly
knowledgeable in the investment company field, could not name Wellington Fund's
investment adviser. No greater knowledge can be imputed to the investing public."
69. SPEcrAL STruDy pt. 4, at 344. Performance here means return on investment.
The difficulty is that investors measure return by proceeds received without understanding that the source of the fund payments might not be portfolio stock dividends
but capital gains derived from sale of portfolio shares-a course of conduct that might
have long range adverse effects.
70. Id.
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purchase shares of a given mutual fund. In so doing they are choosing
to submit their money to a mutual fund whose objectives and performance they believe to be consistent with their needs, knowing that their
money will become part of a diversified portfolio managed by an
organization other than the fund itself, and expecting performance to
be superior to that of the market averages.
E. Kindred Law
While inquiry into the appropriateness of using other, already
developed bodies of law as a primary source of mutual fund law is a
useful tool for wise resolution of mutual fund problems, it should be
noted that there are problems that might arise for which trust law
or corporation law, even if applied in accord with the following discussion, might produce undesirable or unworkable results. It is not
contended, however, that these proposed sources of law are capable
of providing rules to govern any and all problems of interaction that
might arise within the mutual fund, and particularly not within all
the variations of form includable under a general definition of the
mutual fund. Rather, this paper deals with the core concept of the
mutual fund and what will, in most cases, be an appropriate source of
law to help solve problems which arise in the basic mutual fund.
It should also be said that those bodies of developed law suggested
by this note as relevant to the operation of mutual funds do, not
necessarily set out the rules identical to those which should be used
to regulate the mutual fund. They do not constitute bodies of mutual
fund law; they are only bodies of law that can, and, according to
this note, should be used as sources of learning from which analogies
to the mutual fund can validly be drawn and hence which ought
substantially to shape the developing body of mutual fund law.
III. THm COn1oRATioN
Since most funds are corporations, inquiry into the functioning of
the typical business corporation seems proper to determine which
functional elements of a business corporation correlate positively
with the functional elements of a mutual fund, and thereby to deter•-mine which elements of business corporation law ought to be
particularly influential in the formation of mutual fund law.71 The
functioning model of the mutual fund 2 bears close resemblance to
71. The underlying assumption is that the whole of corporate law is a reflection of
the operation of a typical business corporation. To the extent that another ehterprise.
differs in its typical operation, even though it too is a corporation by form, it is
deserving of something other than the whole of corporate law.
72. For description see text accompanying note 20 supra.
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that of a business corporation73 in that both rely on investors who
supply capital in return for stock certificates; both are managed on a
day to day basis by hired managers; and both have boards of
directors which bear ultimate legal responsibility for the functioning
of the institution.
A. The Investors
The investors in the two enterprises seem to be most closely akin.
The shareholder's stock certificate in both institutions gives the shareholder a proportionate claim to the property of the organization. 4
In the business corporation the asset value increases as profits are
earned or, occasionally, as additional stock is issued and sold; in the
mutual fund the same increase is caused primarily by the issue and
sale of new shares of stock and, secondarily, by the appreciation of
property currently held.75 In each case too, the shareholders elect
directors. This is generally true in the business corporation76 and
always true in the mutual fund. 7 There is also substantial identity
in the general profiles of the two shareholders. The business corporation stockholders who hold from one to five hundred shares own 98
per cent of the shareholdings. 8 Although there are more than 8.5
million business corporation shareholders they are generally a class of
small, scattered, and indifferent investors.7 9 Still, more than 68 per
cent of the shareholders earned more than 5000 dollars per year;8 0 55
per cent of the families earning more than 10,000 dollars own shares of
stock;8' and more of those with a college degree own stock than do
those in any other educational group8 2 The most stock laden age
group is that between 50 and 5983 while more professional people own
73. The corporate legal form must be distinguished from the functional business
corporation however. The former, which is not the subject of analysis in this paper, is
a legal structure under which a business may be organized pursuant to the laws of a
particular state. It is a static concept requiring only the existence of numerous
formalities. The functional business corporation is a dynamic concept which includes
consideration of the interaction among the formalities of the corporate legal form.
74. 11 W. FLErcHE, CoPoRAToNS, § 5100 (rev. vol. 1958).
75. See note 23 supra.
76. 2 W. FLETcHER, Com'oRAToNs, § 285 (rev. vol. 1954).
77. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(16)(a) (1964) (requiring directors be elected by holders of voting securities) and § 80a-18(i) (requiring every
share of stock be voting share.)
78. G. HuBRS, SocIAL Aspects OF ENTERPRISE IN THE LARGE CorPonATIon

(1950).
79. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AmERICAN STOcKHoLDER 20 (1958).
80. Id. at 27. These statistics originated in Knvmm., SHRE OwNEsH,

24

IN THE

UNITED STATES (1952).

81. Id. at 29. The next highest percentage was 19.8% of those in the $5000 - $10,000
income range.

82. Id. at 29. The percentage of the group with four years or more of college was
29.4%. Only 9.6% of the high school graduates owned stock.
83. 1& at 30.
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stock than any other occupational group except housewives.
In a
word, the two types of shareholders occupy a very similar position
with respect to their corporation, be it a business corporation or a
mutual fund.
B. Management
Also, the management group in the business corporation is somewhat
similar to the management group or investment adviser in the mutual
fund. Both are selected and engaged by the board of directors, and
both may have their period of affiliation terminated at any time by
the board8 In the mutual fund, however, shareholders must approve
any new management group86 whereas in the business corporation the
board typically performs the entire hiring process by itself.87 In
both cases the apparent quality of the management group is a
consideration in the investment choice. Further, in the mutual fund,
the investment adviser is normally limited to six of ten places on
the board, but where it also acts as the fund's principal underwriter,
it is limited to only four of ten places. 88 The business corporation, on
the other hand, has no externally imposed limits on the makeup of
its board. It may range in composition from exclusively company
executives to exclusively non-management representatives. 89 Yet
typically, management is represented by one-fourth to one-third of
the average of ten to fourteen directors.9 0
Despite their apparent similarity, the management group of the
fund does differ from that of, the corporation in two critical respects:
form and relationship. First, a mutual fund's investment adviser is
generally a corporation 1 and as such is, unlike the executive corps
of a business corporation, a separate entity with shareholders, a board
of directors and its own corporate sovereignty. Indeed, in some
extreme cases, the distinction between the adviser and client mutual
fund is strictly legal; it is the fund that possesses no office or employees
independent of its hired investment adviser. The necessary result of
managements corporate nature is to inject an element of insulation
between the fund board of directors and the adviser that would not
84. Id. at 32. Within the professional group are doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, dentists. Three times the number of housewives were shareholders than professional men.
85. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15) (a) (3) (1964).
86. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15) (a) (1964).
87. 2 W. FL~rcm=, ComponATmONS § 285 (rev. vol. 1954).
88. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(10) (1964).
89. American Tobacco Company subscribes to the former view while the Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey subscribes to the latter. Htu'F, SocmLi AsPECrs oF
ENTEpEIE 103 (1950).
90. Id. at 99.
91. See note 44 supra.
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be present in the normal business corporation arrangement. Thus,
a fortiori, the shareholders are more insulated from the actual management of the fund as well. The nature and practical effect of this
insulatory feature are uncertain but it, at least, makes communication
by the shareholder with management more difficult and creates an
uncustomary barrier between ownership and management.
The second critical difference between the fund-adviser and corporation-management relationships is that the adviser is under written
contract to the fund, whereas the executive corps is normally bound
by no formal agreement with the business corporation. Even though
the formal employment contract is terminable at the discretion of the
fund board or shareholders, it is in the nature of a more permanent
relationship than a mere oral agreement to employ. A conclusion that
this usually results in a longer period of affiliation for fund management does not necessarily follow, however, since both the corporation
and the fund are strongly affected by inertia. One element of
this inertia is implicit in the frequently made accusation that corporate directors merely "ratify decisions which they have not reached,
based on arguments and evidence which they cannot appraise."92
The natural result is a tendency against change, particularly a
change where avowed opponents would doubtless gain representation
on the board and attempt to influence the independent director's
decision. A second element which normally limits shareholder
pressure for change is that most investors purchase shares in a corporation because they approve present management and want to take
advantage of its expertise. It is doubtful that such an unorganized
group would exert much meaningful pressure to oust the current
executive corps.
The more significant effect of the express contractual relationship
is that it provides less opportunity for positive control of management
by the fund directors. In the fund, management's obligations and
guidelines are established by their employment contract. They are
controlled by the words of the contract which seldom change. Indeed,
for the board to change investment objectives requires a full vote of
the shareholders. 93 While the board still has the power to terminate
the contract at any time without penalty, in terms of practical operation, so long as the adviser stays within the guidelines set out in
its employment contract, the board, barring gross abuse of trust by
the adviser, would probably feel obliged to continue the relationship
at least until the annual renewal date.9 4 Further, because the relation92. DOUGLAs, DEoctAcy AND FINANCE 49 (1940).
93. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(13) (1964).

94. Each adviser contract must be renewed annually by either the board of directors or the shareholders. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15)(a)(2)

(1964).

Normally this is done by the directors.
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ship is between corporate entities, the fund does not have such
complete access to the adviser's records of its dealings on behalf of
the fund as would a corporation to the records of its management
group. The danger is that the directors cannot keep as close a watch
on the fund management as their business corporation counterparts
are able to keep on their executive corps.
Management of the mutual fund then does occupy a different place
in the fund structure than corporate management does in the normal
business corporation structure. The critical differences are two: form
and relationship. An incorporated management group under express
contract to the unit to be managed is materially distinct from individual managers who may be dismissed summarily. The effect of this
difference is to insulate directors and hence shareholders from the
workings of management to a degree unknown in the customary
corporate arrangement.
C. Board of Directors

Although much of the form and operation of the board of directors
in both the mutual fund and business corporation has already been
discussed, one major area of distinction remains. In the business
corporation "[t]he management ... is almost exclusively in the hands

of the board of directors."95 Whether active management is undertaken by the board itself or by officers who are or who are not
members of the board, its supervisory function and its power of
removal keep the actual operation of the corporation within the
control of the directors. 9 Direct management by the business corporation board, according to one commentator, involves four functions:
decision, confirmation, consultation and reviewf 7 The directors decide
those questions that they cannot delegate such as fixing executive
salaries; they confirm provisional decisions of executives such as the
settlement of lawsuits; counsel executives on policy problems such as
those involved in the introduction of new product lines; and review
past actions of the executives. Indirect management is effected
through corporate officers and committees over which the board has
supervisory control and through power of summary dismissal. These
two characteristics of business corporation management-direct and
indirect control-emphasize the importance of the board of directors
in the short-term functioning of the business corporation.
In contrast is the role of the board of directors in the mutual fund,
who contract with another for the management of the portfolio. Lattin
distinguishes between contractual delegation of management powers
95. N. LATmn, CoI po
96. Id.

noS, 211 (1959).

97. J. BAmz, DmRcEroRs AND THm FuNCTEONS 131-32 (1945).
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and a similar delegation to an internal executive corps by saying:
"There is one essential difference, however, for management contracts anticipate the turning over of the business to outsiders whereas
a delegation of powers to a committee of the board or to the corporate officers keeps the authority in the family and gives the board
the opportunity to supervise and control the activities of committees
and officers."98 The absence of this opportunity to control is reflected
in the earlier discussion of the fund board's activity 9a The board does
not make investment decisions since this function is contractually
delegated; it does not make dividend decisions since the tax law
effectively controls this; it does not fix executive compensation since
that is done by the management corporation; nor does it counsel the
portfolio management on new lines of investment since these must
be approved by the shareholders. Indeed, all the fund board generally does is meet quarterly in order "'... . to review periodically the

recommendations of the investment adviser to determine whether
they are consistent with the general policy and objectives of the company and to appraise the investment results achieved."'100 Contrasting
this with the business corporation, one must conclude that the board
of directors of the latter participates more actively in the management of the corporation than the mutual fund board does in the
management of the fund.
D. Summary of Contrasts

What then are the points of distinction between the functional
models of the business corporation and the mutual fund that cause
standard business corporation law to be inappropriate as a body of
law to control the mutual fund? There is but one. The mutual fund,
unlike the business corporation, contracts with another corporate
entity for the latter to undertake the major portion of the former's
management duties. As a result, the mutual fund board of directors
is one step removed, both functionally and informatively, from the
actual management of the investor's money. The board is thereby
prevented from closely controlling the use to which the money is
put. Since the shareholder has claims only against the board, he
is insulated from effective control over his class interest. The business
corporation, on the other hand, distributes the duties of management
among its directors and officers. As a result, the business corporation
board of directors remains close, both functionally and informatively,
98. N. LATnNr, COm'ORATONs 225-26 (1959).
99. See text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
100. WARTON REPoRT 50. This is a description of the activity of the board of
directors of Axe-Houghten Fund A. Compare the business corporation board which
is said to meet from 10 to 20 times a year. NATIONAL INnUsTRuAL CoNFUENsC. BoAnn,
Comm'ENsATIO AND DuTrEs OF CoaRonATE Dmncors 11 (1946).
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to the actual management of the shareholders' investment. The board
is thus able to control closely the use of the invested money. Since
the shareholders have rights against the board, they are protected
by the board's effective control over their class interest. It is this
additional gap between management and ownership in the mutual
fund that distinguishes it from the business corporation; and it is
the probability that this insulation will result in activity not in the
best interest of the shareholder that a system of mutual fund law
must minimize.
IV. THE TRUST
A. Trust Distinguished from Business Corporation

Like the business corporation, the private express trust is a managerial institution which is significantly similar to the mutual fund.
The corporation and trust forms are distinguishable, however, in terms
of the kinds of legal duties found in each. In the trust, for instance,
there is, on behalf of the trustee, a legal duty to the beneficiary to
exercise only those "powers as are necessary or appropriate for the
carrying out of the purposes of the trust and are not forbidden by
the terms of the trust."1 1 Business corporation law imposes the same
limit on the actions of corporations, 102 but their purpose, generally
couched in terms of "field of activity," is broader than the customary
trust or mutual fund purpose. For example, a recommended statement of purpose that will satisfy state corporation law for a proposed
investment corporation says only "To acquire, dispose of, underwrite
10 3
and deal in securities and to do a general investment business."
In contrast, the mutual fund is required by statute to deliver a prospectus to the potential investor at or before a sale of shares which
contains, among other things, a description of the fund and of its
objectives0 4 in terms which will fully set out the fundamental policy
of the fund. The private express trust must of necessity impose active
duties on the trustee, for without such an imposition the Statute of
Uses would terminate the trust by executing the use.105
As a legal consequence of the statement of fairly definite objectives
in the trust, there arises on behalf of the trustee an equitable duty
to deal with the property in accord with those purposes, and there
is bestowed upon him the power to fulfill those purposes. The same
101. 2A. ScOTT, TRUSTS § 186 (2d ed. 1956).
102. N. LATMn, CORPOa-MONS 177 (1959).
103. 1 W. FLETcHm, CoRonAT FORMS ANNOTATED § 537 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1957).

104. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(10), 77(e)(b), 77(j) (1964). Requirements as to the content of prospectuses are contained in Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(8) (1964).
105. 1 A. ScoTT, TRUsTs §§ 67-69 (2d ed. 1956).
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is true of a corporation board of directors. They too are empowered
and limited to act within the stated corporate purpose. Since, however, the corporate purpose is usually stated in relatively broad terms,
the board is generally permitted a wider latitude of activity than is
the trustee. Thus, the spectre of ultra vires acts and resulting liability
is less constrictive in the corporation than is its counterpart in the
trust. Concomitantly, the beneficiary in a trust has the power to enforce outer limits on his trustees' actions with more particularity and
hence has more effective control than has the shareholder over his
board of directors.
What is more important for purposes of beneficiary control of the
trustee is that the trustee's fiduciary duties run directly to the beneficiary, since the trust is merely a relationship and not a separate legal
entity. Compare this with the business corporation board of directors
whose duty runs to the corporation on whose behalf the shareholders
may bring an action. While the nature of a corporation as a separate
legal entity strongly encourages this alignment of duty, note that it
tends to create in the corporate form a gap between directors and
shareholders the result of which is to undermine shareholder confidence in their rights and powers against the directors. In the trust,
on the other hand, the alignment of duties, and knowledge of this
alignment, bolster the confidence of the beneficiary in his powers of
supervision and control. The result can only be greater concern by
trustees conscientiously to fulfill their equitable duties than one finds
in the business corporation.
Finally, the trust is distinguishable from the business corporation
because implicit in the trust relationship is an intense duty of loyalty
directly to the beneficiary. "The most fundamental duty owed by the
trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust is the duty of loyalty ....
[The fiduciary element] is peculiarly intense in the case of a trust.
It is the duty of the trustee to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries." 10 6 This duty is breached when, without
express permission from the beneficiaries or authorization from the
trust, the trustee purchases trust property for himself even though
the sale was made in good faith and for fair consideration. 0 7 The
same duty is breached where the trustee has a personal interest in
the buyer of trust property such as a corporation in which the trustee
is a significant stockholder. 1' 8 It is also breached where the trustee uses
the trust property for his own purposes. 0 9 The corporate director's
106. Id. § 170.

107. Id. § 170.1.
108. Id. § 170.10.
109. Id. § 170.17.
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fiduciary duty, on the other hand, not only does not run directly to
the shareholder, but neither is it so intense. The issue of a director
purchasing corporate property is generally decided in favor of the
director where the transaction is found to be reasonable." 0 The same
is true of a director's separate business purchasing corporate property. It has even been said that "Directors or officers of a corporation
are not, by reason of the fiduciary relationship they bear toward the
corporation, necessarily precluded from entering into an independent
business in competition with it, but, in doing so, they must act in
good faith.""' Clearly then, the director's duty of loyalty is somewhat less demanding than that of the trustee.
B. Similarities of Trust and Mutual Fund
The comparison of trust law is relevant to the mutual fund because
many of the functional characteristics of a trust are essentially similar
to those found in the mutual fund. Central to this similarity is the
three part form that the trust sometimes takes in order to fulfill its
function. Often the settlor will select a trustee not for his ability to
perform the managerial functions required by the trust but for his
trustworthiness. In these instances, the selected trustee will hire managers under contract and will periodically review their performance
to ensure competent management. At these times, the active relationship between the investor and investment adviser in the mutual fund
is more nearly like that between the beneficiary and actual management in the private express trust than it is like that between shareholder and management in the business corporation. For example,
the investor, in both the private express trust and the mutual fund,
enters into an agreement which specifies the limitations upon the
use to which his investment may be put by stating in relatively explicit
terms the purpose for which he intends his money to be used. In contrast, the corporate shareholder imposes no such defined limitations
on the use of his investment. Further, in both trust and mutual fund,
the investor is the one to be primarily benefitted. The trust, a relationship to accomplish the intentions of the settlor, demonstrates this by
its customary operation and by the legal relationships contained therein.The mutual fund suggests this by basically functioning as an in2
vestment institution and by passing through all of its "net gains""
to the shareholders. Finally, in both the mutual fund and trust
the investor commits his funds in the belief that the policies that he
110. N. LATTmw, CosuPoRATIoNs 257-60 (1959).
111. Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 423, 34 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1941).
112. Note that the tax law requires the mutual fund to pass its net gains through
if it is to avoid taxation of them at the corporate level. See text accompanying note
43 supra.

1138

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL.. 20

has adopted or stated will be carried out faithfully without need for
constant supervision. Hence the word "trust" and the claimed advantage of mutual funds in relieving the investor from the burdens
of ownership. Thus, a brief look at the fund from a functional viewpoint shows that it is materially similar to the corporation in all ways
except for the investor-management relationship, and that for purposes of the investor-management relationship the fund is materially
similar to a private express trust. It does not then seem unreasonable
to look first to corporate law for a base from which to reason and
develop mutual fund law for all purposes but investor-management
duties, and for those duties to look first to trust law. Factual analysis
of the three institutions suggests such a dual orientation; and in addition, a need for a remedy to the problem of investor insulation supports the conclusion. By imposing the duty of loyalty found in the
trust on the fund board of directors and by causing them to be clearly
and directly answerable to the investors for any breach of this duty,
the board becomes a policeman whose concern for the welfare of the
investor is maximized. Thus, the investor who is attracted to the
mutual fund because of his relative naivete in the financial marketplace will be more likely to receive the watchful protection that he
particularly needs while at the same time the directors are fairly encouraged to fulfill their obligations vigorously. 13
Application of this relatively simple dually-oriented system of law
is subject to at least two limitations. The first is that which arises
through recognition of the fact that this system is only a logical
starting point for the development of mutual fund law. It is entirely
possible that the trust standard of fiduciary obligation may impose
such a burden on the directors as to prohibit the effective operation
of the fund. Thus when scrutinizing a fund characteristic, which is
more nearly typical of a corporation than of a trust, the concept of
corporateness should properly relax the rigidity of the fiduciary duty
to the extent necessary for effective operation. While such modifications should be made only to satisfy a clear need, there is no reason
to limit unduly the flexibility of the proposed system. A second limitation on the dictates of the common law are statutes, primarily federal, which impose various requirements on the structure and operation of the funds. A detailed discussion of their effect follows. In the
last analysis, however, there remains the core thesis that the best
source of mutual fund common law is a combination of corporate
and trust law.
113. Dr. Vannever Bush wrote a pamphlet entitled The Role of the Independent
,Trusteeof a Mutual Fund published by the Putnam Management Company, Inc. which
comments on the independent director's role with respect to management.
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V. STATUTORY REGULATION

Mutual funds have been subjected to significant federal statutory
regulations since 1940 when the Investment Company Act" 4 was
passed to protect "the national public interest and the interest of
investors ...."115 Based on the interstate commerce clause and congressional power to control the mails,n 6 The Act performs its function of protecting investors through the use of four techniques: first,
by making easily available to the prospective as well as present investor sufficient information for Lhim to be able to make a reasoned
decision as to the nature of the fund; second, by limiting the scope
of activity of the fund where such activity is deemed to be too likely
to be detrimental to the investor's best interests; third, by reposing
in the investor all the power necessary to terminate those relationships of the fund with parties that have control or substantial influence
over the disposition of the investor's interest; and finally, by structuring the fund in such a way as to minimize the potential dangers to
the investor inherent in its operation. Thus the regulatory scheme is
significant because it recognizes the need for higher standards of
protection than corporate law would provide, and it defines the legal
context in which the mutual fund must operate." 7 Hence, it forms
the structure around which the proposed mutual fund common law
must develop.
A. Board of Directors
The board of directors is the most vigorously regulated participant
in the mutual fund. In order to inform the general public, the board
is required, on behalf of the fund, to register a statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, open to the public, that not
only satisfies all disclosure requirements on the issue of new securities" 8 by standard business corporations, but which, in addition,
114. The Act includes within its regulatory scope every company which isor holds
itself out to be primarily engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading
in securities. Through the exceptions to this general rule, the statute narrows its
scope to those companies which issue their shares to the shareholders and which are
not regulated by any other governmental body. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a(3) (1964).
115. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(1)(b) (1964). The Investment
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b(1), (21) (1964), was also passed in 1940. The effect
of this statute on the subject matter of this paper is minimal; hence, the statute will
not be treated.
116. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(7)(a) (1964).
117. For an enlightening discussion of desirable modes of solution for investment
fund problems and the suggestions of the then trade group of 1he -industry, see J.
FoWNLEn, AEmncAN INvjasmENT TRUSTs 228-39 (1928).
118. For these requirements see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964);
Securities- Exchange- Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1964).
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describes the scope of the intended activity of the fund, states its
fundamental policy," 9 and gives full descriptive information on affiliated persons, officers and directors. 120 As is the case with a business
corporation, prospectuses containing registration information must be
transferred to the prospective investor on or before sale of any securities to him. The fund is also required to furnish its investors
with semi-annual reports containing a balance sheet, a statement of
assets, a statement of income, and a statement of purchases and
sales.' 21 This provision seems to be a compromise between corporate
law which requires annual reporting and trust law which requires
reporting on demand but at reasonable times. In its efforts to prevent the fund from undertaking unduly hazardous activities, the statute forbids the fund to acquire any securities which are underwritten
by any of its officers, directors, employees or advisers.'22 Neither
may the fund purchase portfolio shares on margin, sell short, nor
participate in a trading account.2 3 Further, without shareholder ap124
proval the fund cannot swap its shares for securities in other funds.
The fund is allowed, however, to sell its shares through an underwriter or by itself but only at the prospectus price; to restrict the
tradeability of its shares but only in conformance with its registration statement; and to receive only cash or securities for its shares.'2
Finally, the fund may issue senior securities provided it takes the
substantial measures which are prescribed by statute to protect their
safety and the value of the common shares. 126 Limits of this type
are not generally found in either corporate or trust law. Rather, the
less precise limit of public policy forms the bounds of corporate or
trust activity.
The statute limits the composition of the board of directors to
12 7
men who have no record of malpractice in the securities industry.
119. Among the information to be provided is the type of fund (open-end, etc.);
whether it plans to borrow money, issue senior securities, underwrite other securities,
concentrate investments in particular industries, deal in real estate or commodities,
loan money to others, have a high or low turnover rate. Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a(8)(b)(1) (1964).

120. Id.§ 80a(8)(b)(3).
121. I. § 80a(29) (d). Annual reports must contain a statement by independent

accountants.
122. Id. § 80a(10)(f). It may purchase such securities if the fund itself is the
principal underwriter.

123. Id. § 80a(12).
124. Id. § 80a(11). It may convert from one class or series into another class or
series of securities issued by the same company as specified by the instrument subject
to which the securities to be converted were issued.

125. Id. § 80a(22).
126. Id. § 80a(18).
127. Id. § 80a(9)(a). This section prohibits from serving as an officer, director,
adviser or principal underwriter one who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor within the previous ten. years which arose out of securities activities, or one
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It also prevents more than sixty per cent from being members of
any one group such as the investment adviser, fund officers or fund
employees, 12 and thus insures the presence of an independent minority on the board. As a further safeguard, a majority of the directors not affiliated with the principal underwriter must approve
the contract between it and the fund; and a majority of the directors
not affiliated with the adviser must approve its contract with the
fund.'2- The statute also gives the board as a whole the duty to renew
adviser and underwriter contracts, and the power to terminate adviser contracts without penalty.3 0 Lastly, it prevents the directors
from limiting their liability for certain acts in the articles of incorporation of the fund.' 3' In its attempts to vest a power of control in
the investor, the statute requires the investors to elect the board of
directors, 32 to approve new adviser contracts' and to approve changes
in fundamental policy. 34 They are also given the power to renew
adviser and underwriter contracts and to terminate adviser contracts
135
without penalty.
In these last two areas of regulation the statute seems to suggest
that corporate standards do not provide enough investor protection.
The mutual fund board must have an indpendent contingent; key
contracts must be approved by independents; the board must be at
liberty to terminate the adviser's employment contract at any time
without penalty; and investors must approve new advisers and new
policies for the fund. Each of these requirements tends toward trust
fund standards by providing protection over and above what the
shareholder would receive in the corporation where the board need
not be independent from management, and where shareholders may
disapprove of new management and policy only by refusing to reelect incumbent directors or by selling their shares. Appropriately
enough, this same relationship between statutory requirements and
corporate-trust law is also reflected in the statute's regulation of the
investment adviser.
B. Adviser
The statute attempts to insure that the shareholders are informed
who for bad conduct is enjoined by court order from engaging in security company
activity.
128. Id. § 80a(10)(g). If the fund meets certain requirements all of its directors
but one may be affiliated with the adviser in accordance with § 80a(10)(d).
129. Id.§ 80a(15)(c).
130. Id. § 80a(15) (a). Shareholders also have these powers.
131. Id. § 80a(17)(h).
132. Id. § 80a(16) (a).
133. Id.§ 80a(15)(a).
134. Id. § 80a(13).
135. Id. § 80a(15)(a).
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as to the compensation paid the investment adviser by requiring that
the adviser be employed only pursuant to a written contract which
describes all compensation to be paid to it. 136 When a new investor

becomes a shareholder he will be informed as to the amount of this
compensation through the prospectus that he must be shown, 13" and
when a new employment contract is signed, the shareholders will
be made aware of the level of compensation when they vote, as they
must, on whether to accept the contract.138 The statute also seeks
to place control over the adviser, at least through the veto, in the
shareholders or the body more nearly responsive to them, the board
of directors. It requires that the employment contract shall not be
in effect for more than two years except by annual shareholder or
director approval, that it may be terminated by the shareholders or
directors at any time without penalty and that it automatically terminates if assigned.13 9 In addition, the board may not renew the contract without the concurrence of a majority of the independent directors of the fund. 40 The activities of the adviser are also limited
by statute. Where the adviser is the principal underwriter of an issue,
the fund it advises may not acquire any of that issue.'41 Also, it may
not vary from the fundamental policy of the fund without express
shareholder approval.'4 The structural requirements imposed by statute prevent those whose record in the securities field is not good
from serving as adviser.'4 Perhaps the most telling structural requirement is that which prevents more than sixty per cent of the
board from consisting of representatives of the investment adviser
or its affiliate, 44 but permits all but one member of the board 14
to
5
requirements.
stringent
certain
meets
fund
the
if
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be from
Thus where the safety requirements are met, the fund may have
more freedom in the composition of its board, and the "corporationlaw plus" standard need not be employed.
As an over-all system of regulation the Investment Company Act
provides a sound skeleton. By recognizing the importance of the
investor-adviser relationship and by trying to create closer ties between the two, it wisely reinforces the basic corporate web of share136. Id. § 80a(15)(a)(1).
137. Id. § 80a(8)(b)(1).
138. Id.§ 80a(15) (a).
139. Id. § 80a(15) (a) (2)-(4).
140. Id. § 80a(15)(c).
141. Id.§ 80a(10)(f).
142. Id. § 80a(13).
143. See note 127 supra.
144. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(10).
145. Id. § 80a(10)(d). Such a result is permissible if eight safeguards are met.
The apparent purpose of the safeguards is to limit the possible misallocation of expenses as between fund and adviser.
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holder protection to take into account the additional insulation between shareholder and management and the additional need for close,
loyal ties between the two parties in the fund. As such, the statute
strives to create a relation between the two parties146 not unlike that
found in a trust which reflects the functional relation intended by
the investor. Add to this statutory skeleton of regulation the behavioral standards of the trust and fill in the remaining areas with the
legal ramifications of the corporate form, and a relatively complete
source of mutual fund law begins to take shape.
VI. JuDicmi

Acirr

Cases dealing with director liability in the mutual fund situation
reflect uncertainty and confusion in the search for common law principles to supplement specific statutory dictates. It is submitted that
the central reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is the inflexible
use of corporate law as the sole source of regulatory common law.
This approach is readily understandable, since the use by most mutual
funds of the corporate form requires the application of corporate legal
doctrine to them. However, this fact does not mean that mutual
funds cannot justifiably be required to meet standards of dealing more
stringent than those applicable to businesses of other sorts employing
the corporate form. The law has long required higher standards of
some businesses than of others, no matter what form of business association is employed. Consider, for example, the business of insurance. The dealings of insurers with their policy holders have long
been given a special scrutiny by the courts, the relation of insured
and insurer being characterized as one uberrimae fidei. That the
analogy is appropriate is indicated by the high probability that more
and more insurers will soon enter the variable annuity market, offering
annuity contracts whose benefits are closely akin to those claimed by
the mutual funds.
If one accepts the two principal arguments submitted thus far in
this note-that the functional nature of the mutual fund is such that
dealings between the fund and its shareholders require special scrutiny; and that the development of special rules designed for mutual
funds can appropriately be undertaken by the courts, since they have
done so in other areas, notably in the field of trusts-then two further
questions inevitably present themselves: (1) What sources of legal
doctrine provide the best guide to the formulation of "mutual fund
common law"? (2) What should the rules of this mutual fund common law be?
It is the first of these questions which is the concern of this note.
146. For an analysis of the statutory allocation of functions and duties see Lobell,
Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 Y=_.x L.J. 1258, at 1275-88 (1961).
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It is submitted that the best foundation for a cohesive body of
judicially developed rules for the regulation of mutual funds can be
laid by constructing it of materials drawn from two sources: the law
of trusts, and the policies which the Congress enunciated by implication in enacting the Investment Company Act. It is further submitted that this development is appropriate because the Congress
indicated by the statute a desire that mutual fund shareholders be
given greater protection than that afforded investors generally, and
by doing so placed the fund shareholder in a position more nearly
analogous to that of a trust beneficiary. Finally, it is submitted that
the leading case concerning the scope of directors' duties under the
Investment Company Act, Brown v. Bullock,141 demonstrates that such
an approach is both feasible and fair.
In Brown, shareholders of Dividend Shares, Inc., brought suit derivatively and representatively against the directors of the company.
They alleged that their fund was being charged higher fees by its
adviser than was another fund managed by the same advisers; that
defendant directors, members of a board that was controlled by the
adviser, had sent out proxy statements which falsely described their
adviser arrangement as "similar" to that between the adviser and
his other clients; and that this conduct violated a director's duties
under the Investment Company Act 48 as well as under the common
law. The complaint withstood defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court holding that under the Investment Company Act the complaint
adequately alleged a willful conversion and failure by the board, which
was completely controlled by the adviser, to give a "meaningful" approval of the management contract; and that these claims were enforceable by private parties in federal court. The court reasoned that
since the act empowers the board of directors to renew the adviser's
contract annually, and to terminate the contract at will, 149 it impliedly
imposed on the directors a duty to scrutinize the actions of the adviser
in order that it might know when non-renewal, re-negotiation or
termination is advisable. Additionally, the court recognized, but did
not rely on, 50 the common law obligation of corporate fiduciaries not
147. 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aft'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d. Cir. 1961). The
district court opinion is the more illuminating one. The best and most recent discussion of case law under the Investment Company Act is Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect
of Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RtrrGnms L. REv. 181 (1966).
148. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(36) (1964). This section forbids
wilful conversion. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15) (1964), requires the
board to renew the adviser's contract annually if it is to continue for more than two
years.
149. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15).
150. See Lobell, supra note 146, at 1281-82, which roundly criticizes the Brown
case for not discussing the uniqueness of the mutual fund and for assuming that the
corporate mold should dictate the proper regulatory law.
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to misapply willfully the corporation's funds. However, by relying
on the Investment Company Act to define interstitial duties, the
Brown court utilized a more logical approach to the solution of the
source of law problem than is used by the strict corporate, law courts.
Further expansion of this technique to include implications from
other sections of the statute could well provide a workable seed for
the development of a full system of mutual fund common law. Were
this to be done the most controversial provision would, no doubt, be
that section of the Act which empowers the SEC to enjoin any director from acting in the capacity of a director where the Commission
has shown him to be guilty of a gross abuse of trust.151 By using the
"gross abuse of trust" standard in such a way as to define both the
quantitative and qualitative dimensions of whatever duties were not
otherwise provided for in the statute the courts could develop a full
system of mutual fund common law. However, even assuming that
there is found to be a private right of action under this section, there
still remains the problem of a lack of guiding law on the books.
Given the need for predictability in the area, the utility of going first
to the dual oriented corporate-trust system of regulatory common law
becomes particularly attractive. Since too, insofar as director's duties
are concerned, trust law will probably impose higher standards than
would a sophisticated system of mutual fund law, reliance on such
a developed system seems not only useful but safe.
The case of Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc.'5 2 is in clear disagreement with Brown on the issue of whether the Investment Company
Act can be used as an authoritative source from which to infer duties
and under which private rights of action may be prosecuted. In this
case shareholders of Managed Funds filed a derivative suit against
the fund adviser, the fund directors, the fund underwriter (the three
of which were under common control) and the brokerage firms that
handled most of the fund business. The plaintiffs charged that the
fund was being managed in the interest of the controlling group
rather than in the interest of the investors, evidenced by excessive
trading in portfolio securities, questionable allocation of brokerage
business and money paid to members of the controlling group for
which no service was performed. Complainants alleged, as they did
in Brown, that these practices breached a duty owed them under
various sections of the Investment Company Act. 15 The defendants'
151. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(35)
supra note 147, develops this idea more fully.

(1964).

Eisenberg & 'Lehr,

152. 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961).
153. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(1) (1964), which states the general purposes of the Act; Id. § 80a(13), which requires changes in investment. policy
to be approved by the shareholders; Id. § 80a(15), which-requires advisers' contracts
to be renewed annually by the board of directors; Id. § 80a(34), which prohibits
misrepresentation.
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motion to dismiss was granted by the court of appeals on the ground
that the act creates no duties owed by directors which are cognizable
in federal court through a private cause of action. The court, in
failing to allow the suit, factually distinguished analogous cases decided under the other securities acts which had found such a right
of action under either a contract'54 or tort 155 theory. Further, the
court was apparently deterred from allowing such a claim under the
sections imposing criminal penalties for violations of the act' 5 because of the requirement of willfulness. Finally, the court found
that the ".

.

. wording of the Act shows that it was the legislative

intent to refrain from entering the field of director responsibility.""5 7
On the common law claim, since the controlling corporate law did
not make directors insurers, the court found the questioned actions
to violate no duty owed by the directors under either law. Thus the
Brouk court not only ties itself to the erroneous presumption that corporate law is the only appropriate regulatory common law, but it cuts
itself off from a more enlightened source of such law, the implications
of the Investment Company Act. This court apparently believes that
the mutual fund should be held to corporate common law standards
whenever possible, even though the legislature appeared to demonstrate its recognition of the need for higher standards in the mutual
fund field by enacting the Investment Company Act. It is submitted
that this is an undesirable approach to the problem.
Not long after the Brouk decision, Lutz v. Boas'0 was decided by
the Delaware Chancery Court. The case arose out of the same facts
as Brouk, but was based on Delaware corporation law. Chancellor
Seitz found the directors liable for breach of their fiduciary duty
under state common law1 9 because the directors "gave almost automatic approval to the management agreement; they did not examine
the registration statements carefully; they did not discuss securities
at their meetings or discuss any of the other facts which would have
been pertinent to a reasonable discharge of their duties; .

.

. the di-

rectors did not know who selected securities for purchase or sale;
they did not inform themselves about the rate of turnover and how
154. This theory is predicated on the provision of the statute that invalidates contracts entered into in violation of the Act. 286 F.2d at 908.
155. This theory relies on the tort theory that a breach of a statutory duty normally
gives rise to a right of action on behalf of the injured person for whose protection the
statute was enacted. 286 F.2d at 907-08. See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 'U.S.
426 (1964), noted in 18 VAm. L. REv. 275 (1964).
156. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(36) (1964). Id. § 80a(48).
157. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 916 (8th Cir. 1961).
158. 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961).
159. The liability was imposed on independent directors for their negligence as
well as active directors for their positive wrongs. The court took the opportunity to
roundly criticize these independent directors for not carrying out their functions
responsibility. Id. at 395.
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the brokerage business was being distributed." 60 Had these directors
"discharged their responsibilities as to general supervision they would
have discovered these violations of Funds' investment policy."161 Thus,
failure of the directors to perform duties of general supervision constitutes a breach of the corporate fiduciary duty in Delaware.
Even after an enforceable duty has been found to exist, it has proved
difficult to define the scope of that duty. In Acampora v. Birkland 62
a shareholder of Financial Industrial Fund brought a derivative action
against the fund's directors and its combination adviser-underwriter.
The plaintiff sought restoration of certain management fees paid during a period when the management contract was allegedly void because various sections of the Investment Company Act had been
violated. 163 The court allowed recovery for amounts represented by
improper allocation of officers' salaries, office furniture and equipment,
and certain fees on the ground that the allocation of these assets was
in direct violation of the terms of the adviser's contract. However,
of more significance (although dictum only) is the court's statement
of the director's duty inferred, apparently, from the Investment Company Act. On one hand the court says that the standard is "gross
negligence or, . . . at least, bad faith."' 64 But on the other it says:
These non-affiliated directors have a demanding mission and that is the
protection of the assets of Fund and the shareholders. Their position in

relation to Management [the adviser] is adversary in character, and if they
are to properly fulfill their mission they are obligated to scrutinize the acts

and doings of the adviser with great care.165
The legal effect of acting in the gap between "scrutinize . . . with

great care" and "gross negligence" is open to speculation. Suffice it
to say that there is some uncertainty as to the exact scope of the
directors' duty. Here too, the court avoids the difficulties in selecting
an authoritative source for its determination that a dut r exists and
simply cites no authority to support any of its discussion of the issue,
although the language used seems to reflect the policy of the Investment Company Act.
Finally, in Saxe v. Brady'66 shareholders brought a derivative action
against the fund directors, its adviser and its adviser's -parent, alleging
that the adviser's fee of 1/2 of 1 per cent is

"...

unreasonable, exces-

160. Id. at 395-96.
161. Id. at 396.

162. 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
163. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(15) (a) (1964), requiring amendments to adviser's contracts and new contracts to be approved by, the shareholders;
and Id. § 80a(10) (a), which requires 40% of the board to be independent.
164. Acampora v. Birfland, 220 F. Supp. 527,- 550 (D. 'Colo. 1963).
165. Id.
"
166. 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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sive and an illegal waste and spoilation of the Fund's assets." They
contended that payment of the fees and annual renewal of the contract constituted a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty. Although
Chancellor Seitz found the adviser's fee not to be unreasonable under
common law standards, he cautioned that "an independent board
would [not] wait until the fees paid under the management contract
warranted a finding of waste before attempting to negotiate a better
deal."167 Hence although the facts in this case do not justify a finding
of corporate waste, there is some point at which the directors are
obliged to see that the management fee is adjusted according to the
effort necessary to do an adequate job. Thus, although the courts are
not satisfied with the scope of the existing duties as defined by
corporate law, they are reluctant to define a new scope, perhaps of
old duties, which would fit the needs of the mutual fund.
In the final analysis, both the determination of the existence of a
duty and the definition of the scope of that duty with respect to directors has been plagued by uncertainty in state and federal courts.
Of the current approaches, the one that seems most likely to succeed
in the development of a mutual fund common law is that suggested
in Brown, which requires that duties be implied through the provisions of the Investment Company Act and that private rights of
action be allowed thereunder. 1' Even here, recognition of trust law
as a proper indicator of fiduciary obligations would give mutual fund
common law a maturity beyond its years. The typical approach of
the courts in assuming that corporate law should be used has not
proved satisfactory even to the courts and it is submitted that trust
law should be more actively used.169
VII.

:cFNr DEvELoPMmTs

Recent developments both within and related to mutual funds also
reflect dissatisfaction with the way that the funds are currently fulfilling their responsibilities to the investing public. The Wharton
167. Id. at 616.
168. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
169. In the Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. I, at 262-63 (1940), supra note 34, it was
said that the statute did not "impose a trustee obligation on these managers . . .
[because] . . .maybe that obligation is-much too strict." Instead they proposed to
make the manager guilty of a crime for gross abuse of trust. To what extent this
testimony ought to control the duty imposed on directors which is decided upon as a
result of reasoned independent analysis is left to the reader. It is submitted that
sound independent analysis is, perhaps, a more rational foundation on which to base
one's choice of law than is 25-year-old testimony before a Senate subcommittee. In
any event, the reason for the drafter's rejection of a trust standard is that it
would have impracticably harsh results. That may still be true. If so, it still does
not negate the persuasive force of the comparisons between mutual fund, trust and
corporation. It may however alter what conclusiops may wisely be drawn therefrom.
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Report, the Special Study of Securities Markets, and the SEC Report
criticize particular aspects of fund operation which today are the
targets of the most active reform. One such target of both criticism
and reform is the sales practices of mutual funds. Concern has been

expressed that the fund salesmen are poorly trained, 70 and exert an

undue influence on the investment decision.' 7' The response to this
problem has been varied. First, the SEC has required personnel of

firms dealing in mutual fund shares which are not regulated by any
other organization to submit to examinations to determine their eligibility for work as security salesmen, analysts, supervisors or advisers. 72

A second response has been the increased number of no-load funds.
One example is the One William Street Fund, which shortly after

the publication of the Special Study switched to become a no-load

fund by eliminating its eight per cent sales charge.173 Other funds

have taken less drastic measures and reduced their sales charge to
rates comparable to those paid for shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. 74 Most recently the SEC advocated abolition through
amendment of the Investment Company Act of front end load contractual plans and establishment of a five per cent ceiling on sales
commissions.175 Thus, in the field of sales practices, following a recognition of need, steps have been taken to minimize the potential
for danger in the operation of the mutual fund.

The level of investment adviser's fees has also been criticized in the
cases 176 and in the government reports. 7 7 Here too there has been
response from the government and the private sector. The SEC has

proposed that the adviser's cost figures be included in the annual solicitation of proxies to approve the advisory contract as well as in

the prospectus. These figures would include the expenses incurred
170. "The primary problem involves the fund-share shalesmen-most of them parttimers-whose abilities, training and tactics have been the subject of much criticism."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1964, at 108, col. 3.
171. See generally SPECIAL STUmY pt. 4, at 102-212.
172. About 23,000 employees of 954 firms are expected to pass qualifying exams
under the proposed rule-19,000 are employees of 55 mutual fund organizations. An
exam given by state, NASD, NYSE or Amex authorities would exempt an individual
from the SEC examination. In addition, persons associated with one firm since July 1,
1963, and who haven't been involved in state, federal or industry regulatory violation
are exempt. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1965, at 56, col. 2.
173. 72 FoRTuNE 86 (1965).
174. On a $2000 transaction a normal mutual fund sales charge would be about
$170, while a NYSE commission would be about, $27. Wall St. J., April 5,
1g66, at 13, coI. 2.
175. SEC REPORT 22. For detailed discussion on operation of contractual plans and
sales commissions see note 66 supra.
176. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
177. The SEC Report noted that among 57 externally managed funds of more than
$100 million net asset value, adviser fees were double those'found in banks and
funds with internalized advisers. SEC REPo T 11,
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by the advisers in providing their service, the amount paid as a fee
to the advisers from the fund, and the before and after tax income
of the adviser service.1 78 The purpose, clearly, is to provide the investors with sufficient information to vote intelligently for or against
approval of the adviser's contract. Even more recently the SEC
recommended that the Investment Company Act be amended to require that fees paid to affiliated persons such as advisers be reasonable
and that their standard of reasonableness be enforceable by either
the Commission or an aggrieved investor.1 9 Reaction in the private
sector has taken the form in some funds of linking the amount of the
fee to the performance of the fund. When the fund outperforms
the Dow-Jones industrial average percentage increments are added
to the base rate. 180 Thus, in the sensitive area of adviser's fees, the
interested parties are recognizing their substantial obligation to charge
and to approve reasonable fees and are promoting a relationship of
trust between the fund and its investor.
Perhaps the most significant proposal for the improvement of mutual
fund regulation to be made since the Investment Company Act itself
was that made by the SEC in its recent report.' 8' It requested that
sections 35 and 36 of the Act be amended to delete the word "gross"
from the phrase requiring that an individual be "guilty ... of gross
misconduct or gross abuse of trust' in order for the SEC to enjoin
him from acting as an affiliate of a fund. It also requested the right
to enjoin an affiliate from breaching a fiduciary duty and to seek any
additional relief necessary for protection of the investors. Basically,
the SEC has asked Congress to establish by statute the rights and
remedies that the courts using the Brown v. Bullock' 82 approach are
beginning to establish without a specific congressional mandate.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The proposals of this note, the thrust of statutory regulation, the
trend of the case law and the direction of recent developments are
all consistent. In a practical sense, the suggestions here attempt to
provide a reasonable source of law for the men of the industry and
for the courts in search of an authoritative system of behavioral standards. If, for example, a mutual fund has enjoyed such vigorous
growth that the percentage fee now charged by the advisers has lost
its relevance to the actual cost of management, the disgruntled shareholder or the apprehensive director would seek information on potential law suits. They would first turn, no doubt, to the Investment
178.
179.
180.
181.

N.Y. Times, March 19, 1964, at 46, col. 3.
SEC REPORT 13.
Supra note 156.
SEC REP oT 31.

182. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
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Company Act to determine whether the statute specifically imposed
any duties that might be violated. Finding none, the interested party
would, under the proposals of this paper, then turn to duties created

by implication under the Investment Company Act or duties created
by trust law.18 Having determined that such duties arguably exist,
the party, to establish the scope of these duties, would then look to
trust standards in the absence of controlling case law under the

statute. Utilizing the principles of trust law under the theories set
forth in this note, the shareholder might then build his brief, or the

director govern his actions, on the basis of such law to the extent that
it provides reasonable solutions. Suit could then be brought in con-

formity with the procedural requirements of standard corporation law.
This technique, derived from rational analysis of the participants,

emphasizes the best aspects of both predictability and fairness, and
as such is worthy and capable of bracing the newly developing mutual
fund law until such time as it has the strength to stand on its own.
Once this point is reached, there will no longer be a need to borrow

halfway relevant law from other sources or to run the risk of misdirection implicit in the utilization of law in an area for which it was
not promulgated. But, until that time, it is senseless not to apply all
the relevant learning possible to problems analogous to those about
which substantial law already has been developed. It has been the
purpose of this note to demonstrate the utility of this device for the

mutual fund.

J~is M.

ANDERSON

183. Recent entrance of a new type of mutual fund and the resulting concern for
behavioral guidelines illustrates again the utility of trust fund standards. During the
last week of March 1967 the SEC approved five "dual purpose" investment funds for
entry into the public market for the first time. In simple form they require two
investors, one of whom is interested solely in capital gains, the other of whom is
interested solely in income. Each purchases its respective class of security in the "dual
purpose" fund. For the first fifteen years the owner of the income securities receives
all income earned by both his contribution and the contribution of the capital gains
investor, and the latter receives all capital gains generated by the reinvestment
of both his and the income investor's contributions. After fifteen years the securities
mature and the income investor receives his original investment back while the capital
gains investor receives his appreciated investment. At least one fund guarantees a seven
per cent annual return to its income investors.
The primary reason why the SEC required more than a year to approve this new
concept in mutual funds was its concern over how a fund could serve two masters,
that is, both income and capital gains. 'What guidelines would the fund use to
channel its investments in such a way as to act in the best interests of both income
and capital gains securities holders? The question was never fully answered. It is
submitted that the method of analysis proposed by this paper provides the best answer.
The courts, encouraged by the SEC and enlightened litigants, could look to trust fund,
law to determine the guidelines for similar situations therein provided. For instance,
trust law has dealt with this same problem when a trustee is charged with responsibility for both life estate income beneficiaries and remaindermen. The same conflict
between income and growth investments exists here and here also can be found a
body of thoughtful consideration on the problem.

